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Salim v. Mitchell: A First in Accountability for Victims of the United States Torture Program
Abstract: 
This comment aims to demonstrate that U.S. federal civil courts are capable of handling 
lawsuits involving torture abuses committed under the post-9/11 CIA torture program. This 
comment analyzes the court’s decision in Salim v. Mitchell, a case that was brought by the ACLU 
on behalf of three torture victims, which, for the first time in U.S. history, was scheduled to go to 
trial. This comment uses the case to demonstrate that federal courts are able to handle torture 
violation claims that have been committed in the name of national security within the context of 
the war on terror.  Indeed, when Salim v. Mitchell settled a week before trial, the settlement itself 
became a historic landmark for these victims. This comment explores the post-9/11 CIA torture 
program and provides an overview of the international and national laws concerning torture and 
other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, as a background for the argument that no law, 
domestic or international, permits the use of torture for any reason. The obstacles to universal 
jurisdiction and how they have rendered ineffective any attempts by foreign nations to bring 
accountability for CIA-related torture violations are also analyzed. Finally, the importance of the 
Alien Tort Statute, as a tool to bring justice in U.S. courts, will be discussed, concluding with the 
argument that accountability is still necessary to strengthen the rule of law, to avoid future 
abuses, and most importantly, to remedy the harm suffered by victims of torture. 
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I. Introduction 
They first came for the Communists, 
and I didn’t speak up because I wasn’t a Communist. 
Then they came for the Jews, 
and I didn’t speak up because I wasn’t a Jew. 
Then they came for the trade unionists,  
and I didn’t speak up because I wasn’t a trade unionist. 
Then they came for the Catholics,  
and I didn’t speak up because I was a Protestant. 
Then they came for me, 
and by that time, no one was left to speak up.  
Martin Niemöeller  1
 Over five years have passed since the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 
(SSCI) released what is now known as the Torture Report, which describes the CIA’s enhanced 
interrogation techniques and its use in the “War on Terror.” Yet, despite the light shed on the 
illegal practice of many officials, the United States has refused to prosecute any individuals who 
contributed to the post-9/11 CIA torture program. Paradoxically, the only person who has ever 
been convicted by a U.S. court in relation to the post-9/11 CIA torture program has been John 
Kiriakou, former CIA officer, who was charged for publicly criticizing the CIA’s illegal use of 
torture.   2
 Despite the general lack of accountability and the failure of the U.S. government to press 
criminal charges, victims have sought redress in federal civil courts. In 2015, the American Civil 
Liberties Union (ACLU) filed a lawsuit on behalf of three victims in the U.S. District Court for 
the Eastern District of Washington, against the two psychologists who designed and implemented 
the post-9/11 CIA torture program.  In this case, for the first time in history, the Justice 3
Department did not try to derail the lawsuit, and the court did not dismiss the case on state 
secrecy grounds in its 2017 motion to dismiss hearing. Indeed, despite many attempts of the two 
 Martin Niemöeller, First they came… (ca 1946).1
 John Kiriakou, I Went to Prison for Disclosing the CIA’s Torture. Gina Haspel Helped Cover it Up, THE WASH. 2
POST, Mar. 16, 2018.
 ACLU, ACLU Sues Psychologists Who Designed and Ran CIA Torture Program, ACLU.ORG (Oct. 13, 2015), 3
https://www.aclu.org/press-releases/aclu-sues-psychologists-who-designed-and-ran-cia-torture-program.
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psychologists to dismiss, the court consistently ruled that the plaintiffs had a valid claim.  4
Interestingly, until 2017, virtually all torture claim cases had been dismissed on the government’s 
motion on state secrecy grounds. A few days before trial was scheduled, the ACLU announced a 
historic settlement and for the first time in history, victims of the post-9/11 CIA torture program 
obtained some justice.  5
This comment aims to demonstrate that U.S. federal courts are capable of handling 
lawsuits involving the post-9/11 CIA torture program. Part one of this comment examines the 
case of Salim v. Mitchell, a historic landmark for victims of the post-9/11 CIA torture program. 
Part two analyzes the post-9/11 CIA torture program. Part three examines the international and 
national laws concerning torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. Part four 
explores the concept of universal jurisdiction and the U.S. Alien Tort Statute, arguing that 
obstacles to universal jurisdiction (e.g. political pressure) have rendered attempts by foreign 
nations to bring accountability for U.S. torture violations ineffective. The research subsequently 
focuses on the potential of the Alien Tort Statute and its use and success in federal courts. Lastly, 
part five concludes with the argument that U.S. district courts have demonstrated the ability to 
handle CIA torture claims and should be recognized as a potential venue to prosecute these 
claims.  
The right to be free from torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment is one 
of the most fundamental and unequivocal human rights. Yet, many U.S. officials seem unaware 
of that absolute, indisputable prohibition.   6
“As the United States confronts terrorism, legitimate national security needs, public 
anxiety, and the desire for retribution may give rise to the temptation to sacrifice certain 
fundamental rights. But that temptation must be vigorously resisted. The right not to be 
tortured or mistreated is not a luxury to be dispensed with in difficult times, but the very 
essence of a society worth defending.”  7
II. Argument 
 ACLU, CIA Torture Psychologists Settle Lawsuit, ACLU.ORG (Aug. 17, 2017), https://www.aclu.org/press-4
releases/cia-torture-psychologists-settle-lawsuit.
 Id.  5
 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, The Legal Prohibition Against Torture, HRW.ORG (June 1, 2004), https://www.hrw.org/6
news/2003/03/11/legal-prohibition-against-torture#. 
 Id.  7
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A. Salim v. Mitchell Demonstrates the Ability of U.S. Courts to Handle Post-9/11 CIA-
Related Torture Violation Claims. 
In 2017, the ACLU settled a civil lawsuit against James Elmer Mitchell and John “Bruce” 
Jessen, the two psychologists who contracted with the CIA to design, implement, and personally 
oversee an experimental torture program. The ACLU filed the lawsuit in the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Washington on behalf of the plaintiffs Suleiman 
Abdullah Salim (Salim), Mohamed Ahmed Ben Soud (Soud) and Gul Rahman (Rahman), all 
foreign citizens who were able to bring the lawsuit pursuant to the Alien Tort Statute. The three 
plaintiffs had been kidnapped, tortured, and experimented upon by the CIA, and Rahman died as 
a result.  This case marked the first time in U.S. history where the government did not invoke the 8
“state secret privilege” to shut down the case before it started and instead decided to consider 
“protective measures” to safeguard its interests while allowing the case to move forward.  This 9
had never happened before and it meant that some torture survivors were finally going to have 
their day in court.  Less than three weeks before the jury trial was scheduled to begin on 10
September 5, 2017, the ACLU announced that the case had settled. ACLU Attorney Dror Ladin 
stated it was a victory for their clients and for the rule of law, adding: “[t]his outcome shows that 
there are consequences for torture and that survivors can and will hold those responsible for 
torture accountable. It is a clear warning for anyone who thinks they can torture with 
impunity.”  Even though, the terms of the settlement remain confidential, this lawsuit is 11
extremely important not only because it is the first time this type of case was not dismissed on 
state secrecy grounds, but also because it showed that federal courts are capable of handling 
torture violations claims that have been committed in the name of national security within the 
context of the war on terror.  12
1. The ACLU Files a Lawsuit on Behalf of Three Torture Victims Against 
Two Psychologists Who Designed and Implemented the Post-9/11 CIA 
Torture Program. 
 Salim v. Mitchell, 268 F. Supp 3d 1132 (E.D.Wash. 2017).8
 Id.9
 Dror Ladin, The Government's Unprecedented Position in CIA Torture Lawsuit is Very Good News, ACLU.ORG 10
(April 15, 2016), https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security/torture/governments-unprecedented-position-cia-
torture-lawsuit-very-good-news. 
 ACLU, CIA Torture Psychologists Settle Lawsuit, supra note 4.11
 Id. 12
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Plaintiff Salim is a Tanzanian citizen, who was captured by the CIA in Somalia, where he 
was working as a trader and fisherman. He was detained for more than five years, until being 
released without charges in 2008. Plaintiff Soud is a Libyan citizen who had fled Libya fearing 
prosecution by the Gaddafi regime and went to Pakistan, where he was captured by U.S. and 
Pakistani forces.  He is not the only innocent man who opposed the Gaddafi dictatorship who 13
has been detained by the CIA and later released without charges.  After Soud arrived at 14
COBALT, one of the CIA black sites, he was told “he was a prisoner of the CIA, that human 
rights ended on September 11, and that no laws applied in prison.”  Soud was detained by the 15
CIA for over a year when he was then turned over the Libyan government, and imprisoned for 
another seven years until the Gaddafi regime was overthrown.  Plaintiff Rahman was born in 16
Afghanistan, but living in Pakistan when he was detained by a U.S./Pakistani operation.  All 17
three plaintiffs were subjected to numerous torture methods, including prolonged sleep 
deprivation, walling, stress positions, facial slaps, abdominal slaps, dietary manipulations, facial 
holds, cramped confinement, prolonged nudity, and waterboarding. Plaintiffs were kept in dark 
frigid cells, were not allowed to wash, and were fed meager meals once every other day. Salim 
and Soud continue to suffer repercussions from the torture, including debilitating pain, frequent 
nightmare and flashbacks, and other symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).  On 18
November 20, 2002, Rahman was found dead from hypothermia, dehydration, lack of food and 
immobility, after being chained, partially nude, in a stress position with temperatures around 
freezing (the practice of  “short chaining”).   19
 Defendants James Elmer Mitchell and John “Bruce” Jessen are both U.S. citizens and 
psychologists. Defendant Mitchell was the chief psychologist at the Survival, Evasion, 
Resistance, and Escape (“SERE”) training program and between 2002 and 2005 he worked as an 
independent contractor for the CIA. Defendant Jessen also worked under contract with the CIA. 
 Salim, 268 F. Supp 3d at 1137. 13
 Matt Apuzzo, Sheri Fink & James Risen, How U.S. Torture Left a Legacy of Damaged Minds, THE N.Y. TIMES, 14
October 8, 2016.
 Salim, 268 F. Supp 3d at 1137 [emphasis added]. 15
 Id.  16
 Id. at 1137-1138. 17
 Id. at 1137. 18
 Id. at 1138.19
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Between 2005 and 2009, both defendants worked at Mitchell, Jessen & Associates in 
Washington, where they continued working under contract for the CIA. Defendants produced a 
white paper for the CIA entitled “Recognizing and Developing Countermeasures to Al-Qa’ida 
Resistance to Interrogation Techniques: A Resistance Training Perspective,”  which proposed 20
measures to defeat resistance in interrogations, and justified the use of torture and other cruel, 
inhuman, and degrading treatment. The paper also introduced the idea of “learned helplessness,” 
a phrase that had been coined by American psychologist Martin E. P. Seligman at the end of the 
1960s.  Dr. Seligman conducted research on dogs and learned that, by giving them electric 21
shocks, they stopped resisting once they learned that the could not stop the shocks.  The same 22
theory was applied to CIA detainees. The idea was that if the officials could make the men 
helpless, they would likely give up their secrets.  “The question of what ultimately happened to 23
Dr. Seligman’s dogs never arose in the legal debate. They were strays, and once the studies were 
over, they were euthanized.”  24
2. Plaintiffs’ Complaint Alleges the Defendants’ Extensive Involvement in the 
Post-9/11 CIA Torture Program.  
Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges that the defendants proposed to the CIA twelve torture 
methods. The CIA had initially agreed to only ten of them,  but shortly after, the Attorney 25
General personally approved another method: waterboarding. Plaintiffs allege that defendants 
“personally conducted or oversaw” aspects of the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah, the first person 
to be detained by the CIA after the attacks in New York City on September 11, 2001 (“9/11”). 
Specifically, plaintiffs allege that defendants physically assaulted Mr. Zubaydah, forced him to 
confinement boxes, subjected him to waterboarding, declared his interrogation a “success” and 
recommended the CIA to use the same coercive methods “for future high value captives.”  26
Plaintiffs also allege that defendants invented the post-9/11 CIA torture program or “enhanced 
interrogation techniques,” including designing some of the instruments for torture. That 
 Salim, 268 F. Supp 3d at 1138-1139.20
 Complaint at ¶ 25, Salim, 268 F. Supp 3d at 1138 (No. 2:15-CV-286-JLQ), 2015 WL 5936374, at *13. 21
 Id.  22
 Salim, 268 F. Supp 3d at 1140.23
 See Apuzzo, et al., supra note 14. 24
 (1) Attention grasp, (2) walling, (3) facial hold, (4) facial slap, (5) cramped confinement, (6) wall standing, (7) 25
stress position, (8) sleep deprivation, (9) use of diapers, (10) use of insects. See discussion infra Section II.B.
 Salim, 268 F. Supp 3d at 1139.26
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defendants further trained and supervised the CIA personnel to apply such program and that, 
while supervising the program, defendants assessed: “(1) whether prisoners had been tortured 
long enough to induce ‘self-helplessness;’ (2) what combinations and consequences of torture 
were most effective; and (3) had the prisoners become fully compliant.”  Defendants were paid 27
over $81 million for their services to the CIA.   28
3. The Court Denies Plaintiffs and Defendants’ Motions for Summary 
Judgment. 
Both parties moved for summary judgement. Defendants raised four primary arguments, 
all of which were dismissed by Judge Quackenbush:  
“(1) the court lacks jurisdiction due to the Political Question Doctrine; (2) Defendants 
are entitled to derivative sovereign immunity; (3) the Alien Tort Statute does not confer 
jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims; and (4) Defendants are not directly liable for 
violating the law of nations, nor liable for aiding and abetting or conspiracy.”   29
Defendants also filed a motion to exclude the SSCI Report (discussed infra, Section II.B).  
Plaintiffs’ sought summary judgment claiming that due to the undisputed facts, 
defendants were liable under the Alien Tort Statute “for aiding and abetting the torture and other 
cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment suffered by Plaintiffs.”  30
 The court found that it did not lack jurisdiction under the political question doctrine. In 
2004, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Rasul v. Bush that it had jurisdiction to consider challenges 
to the legality of detention of foreign nationals captured abroad and incarcerated at the 
Guantanamo Bay Naval Base.  Similarly, in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court held that 31
“due process demands that a citizen held in the United States as an enemy combatant be given 
meaningful opportunity to contest the factual basis for that detention before a neutral 
decisionmaker.”   32
 The Washington court also dismissed defendants’ derivative sovereign immunity 
argument, finding that defendants had a significant role in designing the torture program, training 
CIA interrogators, and exercise discretion in its application.  The court held that a “jury could 
 Id. at 1138-1139.27
 Id. at 1144.28
 Id. at 1145-1154.29
 Id. at 1154.30
 Salim, 268 F. Supp 3d at 1146 (citing Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 470 (2004)). 31
 Id. at 1146 (citing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 509 (2004)). 32
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find they were not acting merely and solely as directed by the Government.”  Case law suggests 33
that “derivative sovereign immunity… is limited to cases in which a contractor ‘had no 
discretion in the design process and completely followed the government specifications.’”  34
Here, the court found that although the CIA may have had ultimate control, both defendants 
exercised “significant control during individual interrogations.” To illustrate, the court pointed to 
defendant Mitchell’s own book, which describes defendants’ role in designing and implementing 
the program.   35
 Further, the court found it had jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Statute, holding that the 
defendants’ conduct “touch[ed] and concern[ed] the United States with sufficient force to 
overcome the presumption against extraterritorial application of the ATS.”  The court also 36
addressed the defendants’ last argument about aiding and abetting or conspiracy while debating 
the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgement. The court held that because neither party 
demonstrated absence of material dispute of fact, neither party was entitled to judgement as a 
matter of law.  37
 Lastly, the court analyzed the defendants’ motion to exclude the SSCI Report (discussed 
infra, Section II.B) on the grounds that it is “hearsay.” The court acknowledged Federal Rule of 
Evidence 803(8)(A)(iii) provides that the hearsay rule does not apply to “factual findings from a 
legally authorized government investigation.”  In addition, the court used U.S. v. Boeing 38
Company’s test to consider the trustworthiness of the report, concluding that the report did not, 
in fact, constitute hearsay.  The court denied the defendants’ motion to exclude on the grounds 39
that defendants failed to meet their burden of proof to establish that the report was untrustworthy. 
 Both the defendants and plaintiffs' motions for summary judgments were denied, making 
the case of Salim v. Mitchell outstanding because it marks the first time in U.S. history where 
survivors of the post-9/11 CIA torture program anticipated having their day in a U.S. court. Even 
 Id. at 1150. 33
 Id. (citing Cabalce v. Thomas E. Blanchard & Associates, 797 F.3d 727, 732 (9th Cir. 2015)). 34
 Salim, 268 F. Supp 3d at 1150; see generally JAMES E. MITCHELL, ENHANCED INTERROGATION: INSIDE THE 35
MINDS AND MOTIVES OF THE ISLAMIC TERRORIST TRYING TO DESTROY AMERICA (Crown F., 2016). 
 Salim, 268 F. Supp 3d at 1150 (citing Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 569 U.S. 108, 133 (2013)). 36
 Salim, 268 F. Supp 3d at 1158. 37
 FED. R. EVID. 803(8)(A)(iii). 38
 Salim, 268 F. Supp 3d at 1160-1161 (citing U.S. v. Boeing Company, 825 F3d 1138 (10th Cir. 2016)). 39
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though it settled before trial, this case marks the first gesture of restitution for the victims of the 
post-9/11 CIA torture program.  40
B. The Post-9/11 CIA Torture Program: A Historical Background. 
In December 2014, the SSCI released the Committee Study of the Central Intelligence 
Agency’s Detention and Interrogation Program (“SSCI Report”),  which became known to the 41
international community as the “Torture Report” . The executive summary features 499 pages 42
describing the CIA program of “indefinite secret detention and the use of brutal interrogation 
techniques in violation of U.S. law, treaty obligations, and [U.S.] values,” commonly known as 
torture.  The full SSCI study totals more than 6,700 pages, but it remains classified, and it has 43
only been provided to the White House, the CIA, the Department of Justice, the Department of 
Defense, the Department of State, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.  44
The report provides substantial details on the history of the CIA’s Detention and 
Interrogation Program, from its inception in 2001 to its termination in 2009. The SSCI Report 
also includes detailed descriptions of the techniques used against the 119 individuals who were 
held in CIA custody, a number that has been highly criticized as being a non-exhaustive list of all 
the individuals that were in fact subjected to the CIA’s “enhanced interrogation techniques.”  45
Lastly, the report acknowledges that the CIA itself determined from its own experience that 
coercive interrogations techniques have historically proven to be ineffective (they did not 
actually produce intelligence and likely resulted in false answers).  However this debate is 46
irrelevant, as international and domestic laws are clear that no exceptional circumstances, 
whatsoever, could justify the use of torture.  
Chairman of the SSCI, Senator Dianne Feinstein of California, explains in her 
introduction to the SSCI Report her hopes that U.S. government bodies will use the full report to 
 Larry Siems, Inside the CIA’s Black Site Torture Room, THE GUARDIAN, Oct. 9, 2017. 40
 See SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, COMMITTEE STUDY OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE 41
AGENCY’S DETENTION AND INTERROGATION PROGRAM, S. REP. NO. 113-288 (2014) [hereinafter SSCI REPORT].
 Jeremy Ashkenas, Hannah Fairfield, Josh Keller & Paul Volpe, 7 Key Points from the C.I.A. Torture Report, THE 42
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2014. 
 SSCI REPORT, supra note 41, at 4. 43
 Id. at 1. 44
 Id. at 12; see also LAURA PITTER ET AL., NO MORE EXCUSES: A ROADMAP TO JUSTICE FOR CIA TORTURE 77 45
(Hum. Rts. Watch, 2015).
 SSCI REPORT, supra note 41, at 3. 46
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prevent future coercive interrogation practices and secret indefinite detentions.  Senator 47
Feinstein reiterates the idea that the report should be used as a guideline for future programs to 
ensure that torture is not used by the U.S. government again.  She correctly notices that even in 48
the wake of 9/11, the pressure, fear, and expectations of terrorist attacks do not “justify, temper, 
or excuse improper actions… in the name of national security.”  However, she fails to mention 49
that by openly condemning the CIA and U.S. government torture practices that started taking 
place after 9/11, the SSCI Report not only highlighted the failure of the U.S. government to 
investigate and prosecute those involved in the program, a failure that it still very much relevant 
today, but it also provided victims with important evidence that could be used in trials, as 
demonstrated in Salim v. Mitchell.   50
Following 9/11, former President George W. Bush obtained authorization from Congress 
to use force against those responsible for the attacks. On September 17, 2001 he secretly issued 
the Memorandum on Notification (MON) granting the CIA “unprecedented counter terrorism 
authority.” Shortly after, the CIA began developing a plan, which later became known as the 
“Rendition, Detention, and Interrogation” (RDI) program.  In March 2002, the CIA captured its 51
first detainee under this new guidance, Abu Zubaydah.  With the help of psychologist 52
contractors James Mitchell and Bruce Jessen, the CIA proposed twelve “enhanced interrogation 
techniques” (EITs)  namely: “(1) … attention grasp, (2) walling, (3) facial hold, (4) facial slap, 53
(5) cramped confinement, (6) wall standing, (7) stress position, (8) sleep deprivation, (9) 
waterboard, (10) use of diapers, (11) use of insects, and (12) mock burial.”  On July 24, 2002, 54
“the attorney general verbally approved the use of 10 [of these] interrogation techniques,” which 
did not include waterboarding nor mock burial.  Nonetheless, shortly after on July 26, 2002, 55
“the attorney general verbally approved the use of waterboard[ing].”  During the month of July 56
2002, “the CIA [also] anticipated that the president would need to approve the use of the CIA 
 Id. at 1.47
 Id. at 5. 48
 Id. at 2. 49
 See generally, Salim, 268 F. Supp 3d. 50
 SSCI REPORT, supra note 41, at 11. 51
 Id. at 22. 52
 Id. at 37. 53
 Id. at 32.54
 Id. at 36.55
 Id. at 36-37. 56
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[EITs] before they could be used.” Consequently, the CIA prepared talking points for a briefing 
of the president. Although CIA records indicate that the talking points were not used to brief the 
president, on August 2, 2002, “the National Security Council legal advisor informed the 
[Director of Central Intelligence] DCI’s chief of staff that ‘Dr. Rice had been informed that there 
would be no briefing to the president on this matter,’ but that the DCI had policy approval to 
employ the CIA’s [EITs].”    57
Before deciding whether these methods would be used on detainee Abu Zubaydah, the 
CIA sought guarantees from the Justice Department Criminal Division that it would not 
prosecute any personnel involved. When the Criminal Division refused, the CIA began working 
with attorneys in the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) to “obtain memos that would authorize the 
techniques proposed.”  The requested memos were eventually issued in 2002, in what are now 58
commonly known as the “torture memos.”  The principal author was OLC Deputy Assistant 59
Attorney General John Yoo and they were signed by Assistant Attorney General Jay Bybee.  60
The torture memos examined international and domestic legal prohibitions on torture, discussed 
the legality of the techniques proposed, and approved the use of the “enhanced interrogation 
techniques” on detainee Abu Zubaydah.  The memos argued that the president was not bound by 61
international law in the war on terror, specifically Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention 
(discussed infra, Section II.C.1). Additionally, the torture memos introduced a new, much 
narrower, definition of torture  (which nonetheless would have still applied to the CIA EITs). 62
Scholars have questioned the legality of these memos, reasoning (1) that there can be no legal 
claim that the president is not bound by the law against torture, (2) that no one has the authority 
to re-write the definition of torture contained in the Convention Against Torture  (noting that 63
the “incredibly narrow definition of torture completely ignored the prohibition against other 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, which would be obvious to anyone who 
 Id. at 38.  57
 PITTER ET AL., supra note 45, at 12. 58
 Id. at 13. 59
 Id. at 12. 60
 Id. at 13. 61
 Id. 62
 The Convention Against Torture is short for the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 63
Degrading Treatment or Punishment. See discussion infra Section II.C.1. 
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chose to read even the full name of the [Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment]”),  and (3) that the war on terror does not give the 64
executive branch the ability to disregard the Geneva Conventions and commit war crimes.   65
After the torture memos were issued, the CIA began opening secret detention centers 
around the world, or “black sites,” where they started using the “approved” enhanced 
interrogation techniques. After the death of Rahman in November 2002, the media began 
reporting on the US use of torture and, to counter these reports, the Bush administration started 
issuing a number of statements discounting any possibility that the US was using torture and 
emphasizing that all detainees were being treated humanely “even if they were not, in the 
administration’s view, protected by international law.”  This was an erroneous statement, as the 66
CIA detainees were, in fact, protected under extensive international and domestic law (discussed 
infra, section II.C). In March 2004, reports and photographs emerged about detainee abuse by 
US military personnel at Abu Ghraib, causing a national scandal.  One of the torture memos 67
leaked into the media and the CIA suspended the interrogation program “pending a legal and 
policy review.” Yoo was replaced by Jack Goldsmith, who strongly recommended that the CIA 
stop the use of waterboarding. Unsurprisingly, he was shortly thereafter replaced by Daniel 
Levin, who was then himself replaced temporarily by OLC deputy head, Stephen Bradbury. 
Bradbury issued two new memos authorizing the legality of the CIA enhanced interrogation 
techniques reasoning that the methods did not violate the U.S. Torture Statute nor the Convention 
Against Torture.   68
In 2005, Congress passed the Detainee Treatment Act, which barred the use of cruel, 
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment against any detainee in US custody and required 
the Defense Department to follow the US Army Field Manual on Intelligence Interrogations 
when conducting interrogations, which was completely ignored by the CIA.  In 2006, the U.S. 69
Supreme Court ruled in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld that Guantanamo detainees were entitled to the 
 Jeanne Mirer & the National Lawyer’s Guild, White Paper on the Law of Torture and Holding Accountable Those 64
Who are Complicit in Approving Torture of Persons in U.S. Custody, 64 GUILD PRACTITIONER 162, 168 (2007).
 Id.  65
 PITTER ET AL., supra note 45, at 15.66
 Id. at 16. 67
 Id. at 18. 68
 Id. at 18-19. 69
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protections provided under Geneva Conventions Common Article 3 and concluded that 
“violations of Common Article 3 are considered ‘war crimes.’”  The same year, President Bush 70
issued the following statement, “I want to be absolutely clear with our people, and the world: 
The United States does not torture. It’s against our laws, and it’s against our values.”  Despite 71
this statement, it took three more years before President Obama, on his second day in office, 
signed an executive order closing the CIA’s secret detention facilities and ending the 
“authorized” use of enhanced interrogation techniques.   72
As of the writing of this comment, the U.S. government has not accounted for the CIA 
torture abuses, even though it has an obligation under international and domestic law to 
prosecute perpetrators and provide redress to the victims. If anything, it “has actively thwarted 
[victims’] attempts… to obtain redress and compensation in U.S. courts.”  With one exception: 73
Salim v. Mitchell. In 2008, the Obama administration appointed prosecutor and Assistant U.S. 
Attorney John Durham to conduct an investigation on the CIA program following the 2007 CIA 
destruction of 92 videotapes depicting CIA officials interrogating and torturing detainees.  The 74
investigation ended up closing on August 2012 without bringing any criminal charges and, 
ironically, no interviews of any of the victims of the post-9/11 CIA torture program either.  75
Considering the later findings of the SSCI, it is hard to believe this investigation was “thorough 
or credible.”  Specifically, problems with the Durham investigation arise out of the fact that it 76
“focused only on CIA abuse that went beyond what was authorized [by the U.S. government].”  77
The fact that the government had indeed authorized the use of torture in violation of international 
and domestic law presented a fundamental problem, this inherent conflict “create[d] a legal 
escape hatch for what would otherwise be the illegal use of torture,”  as conduct which should 78
 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 642 (2006).70
 President Bush's Speech on Terrorism (transcript), THE N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2006, https://www.nytimes.com/71
2006/09/06/washington/06bush_transcript.html. 
 PITTER ET AL., supra note 45, at 19. 72
 PITTER ET AL., supra note 45, at 1-2.73
 Mark Mazzetti, U.S. Says C.I.A. Destroyed 92 Tapes of Interrogations, THE N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2009; Peter 74
Taylor, ‘Vomiting and Screaming’ in Destroyed Waterboarding Tapes, BBC NEWS, May 9, 2012; Dan Eggen & Joby 
Warrick, CIA Destroyed Videos Showing Interrogation, THE WASH. POST, Dec. 7, 2007. 
 PITTER ET AL., supra note 45, at 27.75
 Id. at 2; see also UN Committee Against Torture, Concluding observations on the third to fifth periodic reports of 76
United States of America, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/USA/CO/3-5 (Dec. 19, 2014).
 PITTER ET AL., supra note 45, at 27.77
 Id. 78
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have been investigated was beyond the Durham investigation’s focus (i.e. within the U.S. 
authorization, but also constituting violation of domestic and international law).  
In its 2015 report ‘No More Excuses,’ Human Rights Watch (HRW) called for an 
independent and impartial investigation, with access to the full classified SSCI Report, into the 
U.S. Officials who played important roles “in the process of creating, authorizing, and 
implementing” the post-9/11 CIA torture program. According to HRW, the following officials 
should be investigated for torture, conspiracy to torture, and other crimes:  
“CIA General Counsel John Rizzo, OLC Assistant Attorney General Jay Bee, OLC 
Deputy Assistant Attorney General John Yoo, and individual identified as ‘CTC Legal’ 
in the Senate [Report], CIA Director George Tenet, National Security Legal Advisor 
John Bellinger, Attorney General John Ashcroft, White House Counsel Legal Advisor 
Alberto Gonzales, Counsel to the Vice President David Addington, Deputy White House 
Counsel Timothy Flanigan, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, Defense 
Department General Counsel William Haynes II, Vice President Dick Cheney, and 
President George W. Bush.”   79
In addition, the 2015 HRW Report also identified the two CIA psychologist contractors who 
designed and implemented the post-9/11 CIA torture program, James Mitchell and Bruce 
Jessen.   80
Even though the SSCI Report reminded the world that after 9/11 the CIA tortured at least 
119 people, the U.S. has still refused to prosecute any participant in the torture program. As seen 
above, as of today, the only victims who achieved some form of redress had to bring suit against 
the CIA psychologist contractors.  Perhaps, the HRW list could be used as guidance for future 81
claims. 
C. The Prohibition Against Torture is Widely Recognized Under International and 
Domestic Law.  
The prohibition against torture is firmly embedded in customary international law, 
international treaties signed and ratified by the United States, and in U.S. domestic law. At both 
international and national levels a critical element is the obligation to prosecute and punish 
perpetrators, “yet, no senior U.S. government official has even been prosecuted for torture” with 
 Id. at 2. 79
 Id.  80
 See generally, Salim, 268 F. Supp 3d. 81
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respect to the post-9/11 CIA Torture Program.  A comprehensive analysis of the law on torture is 82
essential to understand the magnitude of this prohibition at both international and national level, 
and its ultimate recognition as a universal norm or jus cogens.  
1. International Law Prohibits the Use of Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment in All Circumstances. 
Following the abuses of World War II, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) 
enclosed the prohibition against torture in Article 5 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR), which provides that “no one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment."  Since then, the prohibition against torture and other ill 83
treatments have been incorporated into the extensive network of international and regional 
human rights treaties.  84
In 1949, states started ratifying the four Geneva Conventions, which demanded humane 
treatment during armed conflicts. The Geneva Conventions have been ratified by 196 states in 
the world, which made those treaties “the first in modern history to achieve universal 
acceptance.”  All four Geneva Conventions consider “torture or inhuman treatment…[and] 85
willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health” grave breaches.  In 86
addition, Article 17 of the Third Geneva Convention on the Protection of Prisoners of War 
provides: “No physical or mental torture, nor any other form of coercion, may be inflicted on 
prisoners of war to secure from them information of any kind whatever. Prisoners of war who 
refuse to answer may not be threatened, insulted or exposed to any unpleasant or 
disadvantageous treatment of any kind.”  Article 32 provides similar protection of civilian 87
 William J. Aceves, United States v. George Tenet: A Federal Indictment for Torture, 48 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 82
1, 7 (2015).
 G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 5 (Dec. 10, 1948).83
 See generally, PITTER ET AL., supra note 45. 84
 ICRC, A Milestone for International Humanitarian Law, ICRC.ORG (Sept. 22, 2006), https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/85
resources/documents/statement/geneva-conventions-statement-220906.htm. 
 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 86
art. 50, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31[hereinafter First Geneva Convention]; Geneva Convention for 
the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Ship-wrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Art. 51, 
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Second Geneva Convention]; Geneva Convention relative 
to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 130, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Third 
Geneva Convention]; Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, art. 147, 
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention]; [collectively hereinafter 
Geneva Conventions].
 Third Geneva Convention, supra note 86, at art. 17.87
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persons. While Common Article 3, which applies in situations of non-international armed 
conflicts (NIACs), provides that people taking no active part in the conflict, “shall in all 
circumstances be treated humanely” and prohibits “violence to life and person, in particular 
murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture” as well as “outrages upon personal 
dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment.”  88
The prohibition against torture is also incorporated in Article 7 of the 1976 International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which has been ratified by 153 countries, 
including the United States in 1992.  Independent experts of the Human Rights Committee 89
(HRC) established the HRC to monitor the implementation of the ICCPR,  and determined that 90
State parties are “obliged to investigate allegations of torture and the graver forms of other 
prohibited ill-treatment with a view of prosecuting the perpetrators. All victims of a violation…
are expected to be compensated.”  91
Finally, in 1984, states formally codified the prohibition against torture into specific rules 
with the adoption of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (“Convention Against Torture” or CAT), ratified by the United States 
in 1994.  In his transmittal message to the Senate, former President Reagan wrote that the U.S. 92
ratification “will clearly express United States opposition to torture, an abhorrent practice 
unfortunately still prevalent in the world today.”  Article 1 of the Convention provides the 93
definition of torture, explained as:  
“Any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally 
inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person 
information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed 
or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or 
for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is 
inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official 
 Geneva Conventions supra note 86, at common art. 3. 88
 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 7, Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].89
 Id. at art. 28.90
 Nigel S. Rodley, The Prohibition of Torture: Absolute Means Absolute, in INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION OF 91
HUMAN RIGHTS CRIMES 110-112 (Wolfgang Kaleck, Michael Ratner, Tobias Singelnstein & Peter Weiss eds., 
Springer, 2007). 
 G.A. Res. 39/46, Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 92
(June 26, 1987) [hereinafter Convention Against Torture].
 Ronald Reagan, Message to the Senate Transmitting the Convention Against Torture and Inhuman Treatment or 93
Punishment, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT, May 20, 1988, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/
message-the-senate-transmitting-the-convention-against-torture-and-inhuman-treatment-or [emphasis added].
231
18 SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 214
or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising 
only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.”   94
Expanding on Article 1, Article 16 establishes the prohibition of: 
“other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment which do not amount 
to torture as defined in Article 1, when such acts are committed by or at the instigation of 
or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an 
official capacity.”   95
The CAT not only describes and defines torture and other ill-treatments, but establishes their 
absolute prohibition. Significantly, Article 2.2 provides that, “[n]o exceptional circumstances 
whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability or any other 
public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture.”  In addition, Article 2.3 96
establishes that “[a]n order from a superior officer or a public authority may not be invoked as a 
justification for torture.”  The CAT details state parties’ obligation to investigate alleged 97
offenders and requires the investigation to be prompt and impartial.  Additionally, it requires 98
state parties to either extradite the alleged offender or “submit the case to its competent 
authorities for the purpose of prosecution.”  Lastly, the CAT establishes the Committee Against 99
Torture (Committee), a group of ten independent experts whose goal is to ensure states comply 
with the Convention Against Torture.  100
2. The U.S. Legal System Was Designed to Include the International Legal 
Framework.   
 When the framers of the U.S. Constitution (“Framers”) met in 1787 to draft the 
document, they purposefully designed it to ensure that states would not violate the international 
treaties ratified by the federal government, nor the obligations those treaties create, with the 
introduction of the Supremacy Clause. Article VI provides that “[the] Constitution, and the laws 
of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which 
shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the 
 Convention Against Torture, supra note 92, at art.1. 94
 Id. at art. 16.95
 Id. at art. 2.2.96
 Id. at art. 2.3.97
 Id. at art. 12.98
 Id. at art. 7.99
 Id. at art. 17. 100
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land[.]”  The Framers had major debates over the balance of power between states and the 101
federal government, but they were unified on the idea that “the Constitution prohibited state 
government officers from violating national treaties obligations.”  The original understanding 102
of the U.S. Constitution has changed since the 1950s and new ideas and debates have emerged 
on whether international obligations prevail over state law or over federal law. However, it 
remains clear that as a matter of international law, the federal government of the United States is 
obliged to comply with the aforementioned treaties.   103
Lastly, it is indeed “[t]his universal condemnation [that] has led the international 
community to place torture in [the] narrow realm of jus cogens norms.”  The concept refers to 104
the “peremptory principles or norms from which no derogation is permitted.”  In contrast to 105
most areas of international law, “jus cogens norms have independent validity and status, separate 
and untouched by the consent and practice of states.”  The concept of jus cogens norms 106
emerged out of the understanding and recognition that certain obligations are owed by states to 
the international community as a whole.  Hence, a violation of such values is a threat common 107
to all people and threatens the “peace, security, and world order.”  The very nature of jus 108
cogens norms has allowed certain values and interests to be recognized as superior to any other 
laws or agreements, whether national, international or customary, and “render[s] any attempt to 
derogate from them void ab initio.”  With the recognition of jus cogens the world, as 109
community, understands that international order is based on a priority of values, rather than 
 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 [emphasis added].101
 DAVID SLOSS, THE DEATH OF TREATY SUPREMACY: AN INVISIBLE CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE (Oxford Univ. 102
Press, 2016).
 There is also a question on whether international treaties are binding on domestic government officials as a 103
matter of domestic law. However, it is a much disputed issue and it would exceed the purpose of this paper for two 
reasons: (1) under international law, the U.S. is obliged to comply with the treaties it ratifies; and (2) the U.S. has 
indeed implemented the Convention Against Torture at the domestic level with the adoption of the Torture Act. 
Hence, at both international and national level, the U.S. is bound by its laws. If interested in the debate on whether 
international obligations prevail over state law and federal law, see David Sloss, Domestic Application of Treaties, in 
OXFORD GUIDE TO TREATIES (Hollis Duncan B. eds., Oxford Univ. Press, 2012); see also SLOSS, DEATH OF TREATY 
SUPREMACY, supra note 102. 
 Aceves, supra note 82, at 18.104
 JOSEPH GABRIEL STARKE, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 59 (7th ed. 1972). 105
 Lorna McGregor, Addressing the Relationship between State Immunity and Jus Cogens Norms: A Comparative 106
Assessment, in INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS CRIMES 71 (Wolfgang Kaleck, Michael Ratner, 
Tobias Singelnstein & Peter Weiss eds., Springer, 2007).
 Andrea Bianchi, Human Rights and the Magic of Jus Cogens, 19 EUR. J. INT’L. L. 491, 494 (2008). 107
 See McGregor, supra note 106. 108
 Id. at 70-71. 109
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sources, which reflect a hierarchy of norms.  While debates arise on which norms reach the top 110
of this hierarchy, the prohibition against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 
has universally been recognized as a jus cogens norm. Acts that violate jus cogens, such as 
torture, are subject to universal jurisdiction, meaning that any states in the world is able to 
exercise its jurisdiction over the alleged offender regardless of where the violation took place, the 
nationality of the victim, or the nationality of the offender themselves.  Universal jurisdiction is 111
analyzed in greater detail in section II.D.1 below. 
3. U.S. Law Prohibits the Use of Torture.  
The prohibition against torture is codified in the U.S Constitution, numerous state 
practices, and in domestic legislation. “Recognizing the potential for abuse during interrogations, 
U.S. courts have constructed special rules to diminish the likelihood of coerced testimony[,]” and 
guarantee due process in the criminal justice system.  Specifically, the U.S. Constitution’s 112
Fourth Amendment establishes the right of individuals to be free from unreasonable searches and 
seizures.  The major idea behind the Fourth Amendment is the right to be protected from 113
abuses by law enforcement. Similarly, the Fifth Amendment provides the right against self-
incrimination.  It contemplates the idea that a defendant has the right to remain silent while in 114
custody and during interrogations, and renders coerced statements inadmissible evidence at trial 
because they are not trustworthy. Since 1966, it also grants rights under Miranda when police 
take an individual into custody, namely the rights to remain silent and to assistance of counsel.  115
The Court in Miranda sought to address the recurrent law enforcement practice of using physical 
force to extract confessions.  Lastly, the Eighth Amendment establishes the right of individuals 116
to be free from cruel and unusual punishments.  As the prohibition against torture has been 117
accepted worldwide as jus cogens, it should certainly fall within ‘cruel and unusual punishment.’ 
 Bianchi, supra note 107. 110
 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 6.111
 Id.112
 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 113
 U.S. CONST. amend. V.114
 See generally, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).115
 Id. at 456 (“given this background, we concern ourselves primarily with this interrogation atmosphere and the 116
evils it can bring…Unless a proper limitation upon custodial interrogation is achieved—such as these decisions will 
advance—there can be no assurance that practices of this nature will be eradicated in the foreseeable future.”)
 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 117
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In 1991, before the U.S. ratified the Convention Against Torture, Congress adopted 28 
U.S.C. §1350, the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (TVPA), which establishes a private 
right of action against individuals who commit acts of torture or extrajudicial killing conducted 
“under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of [a] foreign nation.”  Additionally, in the 118
U.S., the international Convention Against Torture is implemented by 18 U.S.C. §2340 or the 
Torture Act,  signed by former President Bill Clinton on April 30, 1994. The Torture Act 119
entered into force on November 20, 1994. The Torture Act defines torture as: “an act committed 
by a person acting under the color of law specifically intended to inflict severe physical or 
mental pain or suffering (other than pain or suffering incidental to lawful sanctions) upon another 
person within his custody or physical control.”  It also describes “severe mental pain or 120
suffering” as including:  
“prolonged mental harm caused by or resulting from…the intentional infliction or 
threatened infliction of severe physical pain or suffering;… the administration or 
application, or threatened administration or application, of mind-altering substances or 
other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or the personality; … the 
threat of imminent death; or…the threat that another person will imminently be subjected 
to death, severe physical pain or suffering, or the administration or application of mind-
altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or 
personality[.]”   121
The Torture Act creates liability for individuals who commit or attempt to commit torture with 
fines, imprisonment or both. In addition, if the conduct results in the death of the victim, the 
Torture Act provides that the perpetrator should be punished by either life imprisonment or the 
death penalty.  The Torture Act also provides that the U.S. has jurisdiction over acts of torture 122
when the alleged offender is a national of the United States (b)(1) or the alleged offender is 
present in the United States, irrespective of the individual’s nationality of either the victim or the 
 Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §1350) 118
[hereinafter TVPA]. (It is important to note that the TVPA has been extensively and successfully used by foreign 
plaintiffs to sue human rights perpetrators in federal courts when the Kiobel “touch and concern” test (see supra text 
accompanying note 36) has prevented them from suing under the Alien Tort Statute.)
 Torture Act, Pub. L. 103-236, title V, §506(c) (1994) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §2340); see also, Karen Hoffmann, 119
Redress for ‘Some Folks’: Pursuing Justice for Victims of Torture Through Traditional Grounds of Jurisdiction, 46 
GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 97, 105 (2017). 
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offender. (b)(2).  Finally, in 1998, Congress adopted 22 U.S.C. §2151, the Torture Victims 123
Relief Act of 1998, which provides funding for torture victim treatment centers domestically and 
abroad.   124
“There can be no serious doubt that the prohibition of torture and other cruel, inhuman, or 
degrading treatment or punishment is not only a rule based on treaties, but also a rule of general 
or customary international law.”  Even though the U.S. has argued that “unlawful enemy 125
combatants” are furnished no privileges under the Geneva Conventions, “accountability and 
redress for the torture U.S. officials committed and endorsed is required by U.S. and 
international law.”  Ultimately, it is undeniable that the international community recognizes 126
that torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment cannot be tolerated under any 
circumstances. 
D. The Alien Tort Statute has Proven to be a Successful Tool for Aliens Bringing Civil 
Law Suits in U.S. Courts. 
1. Universal Jurisdiction Has Proven to be Ineffective and Controversial in 
Post-9/11 Torture Claims.  
Scholars have discussed the idea of universal jurisdiction for years and although its actual 
enforceability is still subject to debate, the underlying principle is well recognized:  universal 127
jurisdiction allows states to prosecute offenders of gross violations even if the state lacks the 
“nexus” with the crime, offender, or victim.  As Professor Schachter observes, “[t]he implicit 128
assumption is that the right to exercise jurisdiction is not based on the treaties, but on the general 
principles of international law.”  In addition, Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law 129
suggests that “[a]n international crime [such as torture] is presumably subject to [the] universal 
jurisdiction” of all states.   130
 Id. 123
 Torture Victim Relief Act, Pub. L. 105-320 (1998) (codified at 22 U.S.C. §2151). 124
 Rodley, supra note 91, at 198.125
 Hoffmann, supra note 119, at 104. 126
 Peter Weiss, The Future of Universal Jurisdiction, in INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS CRIMES 127
29 (Wolfgang Kaleck, Michael Ratner, Tobias Singelnstein & Peter Weiss eds., Springer, 2007). 
 Kenneth C. Randall, Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law, 66 TEX. L. REV. 785 (1988). 128
 Id. (citing O. SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 240-265 (1985) (“discussing the 129
extent to which a state may apply its domestic law to events and persons outsides of its territory in circumstances 
affecting the interests of the state”). 
 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §404 reporter’s note 1 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1985).130
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Universal jurisdiction is a potential tool for states to be agents acting in the interests of 
the international community, by investigating and prosecuting states or individuals responsible 
for conduct amounting to core international crimes.  Defenders of the principle argue it is a 131
crucial mechanism for “bringing justice to victims, deterring state or quasi-state officials...and 
establishing a minimum international rule of law by substantially closing the ‘impunity gap’ for 
international crimes.”  Unfortunately, it seems that the mere existence and occasional 132
recognition of universal jurisdiction does not enable states to effectively act as agents for the 
international community,  as there are recognized obstacles to actual application of the 133
doctrine. At the end of the 1980s, Doctor Randall noted at least three: (1) states may not have 
custody of the offenders, (2) “states may fail to prosecute criminals within their territory due to 
political and foreign policy considerations,” and (3) modern universal jurisdiction is still 
evolving.   Professor Hall identifies similar obstacles to universal jurisdiction, adding to Doctor 134
Randall's list the practical obstacles of “inadequate knowledge of the forum state’s criminal 
procedures by those filing criminal complaints or civil suits,” and obtaining evidence abroad. 
Lastly, Professor Hall suggests “the backlash against universal jurisdiction since the high-water 
mark in 1999 of the second decision on the merits by the House of Lords in the Pinochet case” is 
likely the biggest obstacle to actual enforceability of universal jurisdiction.  Persuading states 135
to extradite accused persons might prove to be particularly difficult, so the first obstacle might 
still be resolved by prosecuting perpetrators in absentia. With respect to Randall’s third obstacle, 
it may somehow be irrelevant within the torture realm, as the prohibition of torture has been 
universally recognized.  However, political considerations and the backlash against universal 136
jurisdiction since 1999, seem to create an insurmountable barrier to the use of this doctrine today. 
Despite the unequivocal expansion of the principle of universality, states do not often exercise 
 Maximo Langer, The Diplomacy of Universal Jurisdiction: The Political Branches and the Transnational 131
Prosecution of International Crimes, 105 AM. J. OF INT’L L. 1 (2011). 
 Id.  132
 AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, A PRELIMINARY SURVEY OF LEGISLATION AROUND THE WORLD - 2012 UPDATE 2 133
(Amnesty International Publications 2012). 
 Randall, supra note 128, at 840. 134
 Christopher Keith Hall, Universal Jurisdiction: Developing and Implementing an Effective Global Strategy, in 135
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS CRIMES 86 (Wolfgang Kaleck, Michael Ratner, Tobias 
Singelnstein & Peter Weiss eds., Springer, 2007). 
 See discussion infra Section II.C. 136
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universal jurisdiction  and when they do, they are often influenced by political pressure. In 137
particular, the power of the United States relative to other nations tends to influence judicial 
attitudes towards international law.  138
Despite these barriers, “many commentators have called for universal jurisdiction to be 
invoked as a legal basis” to prosecute perpetrators U.S. torture.  Yet invoking universal 139
jurisdiction has undoubtedly proven to be controversial and, worse yet, often ineffective in 
post-9/11 CIA torture violations claims.  Doctor Hoffman provides a satisfying list of European 140
countries that have tried to invoke universal jurisdiction to provide accountability for U.S. 
torture, and also  notes the limited results that resulted after the United States leveraged political 
pressure.  Specifically, Spanish Judge Garzon’s investigation of the “Bush Six” was hindered 141
by Spanish lawmakers after the U.S. informed the investigation would have an “enormous 
impact on [their] bilateral relationship.”  Similarly, several criminal complaints were filed in 142
Belgian courts against former President Bush, U.S. Secretary of State General Powell, U.S. Vice 
President Cheney, and U.S. General Schwarzkopf. However, after intense pressure from the U.S., 
including the suggestion that the U.S. would advocate to move the NATO headquarters from 
Belgium, Belgium passed a law stating that “only the public prosecutor could initiate a suit with 
no connection to Belgium.”  Likewise, Germany’s prosecutor dismissed a complaint brought 143
by an Iraqi torture victim against Donald Rumsfeld because Germany received “immense 
pressure from the U.S. government”  to do so. Nonetheless, at the international level there 144
might be unconventional ways for courts to prosecute these claims. For example, the Italian 
Supreme Court entered a criminal conviction against U.S. and Italian officials for their 
involvement in extraordinary rendition operations.  Despite the fact that certain U.S. officials 145
may be deterred from traveling to Europe in light of this decision, “for victims of U.S. torture, 
 Randall, supra note 128, at 840.137
 Hall, supra note 135.  138
 Hoffmann, supra note 119, at 114. 139
 Id. at 118.  140
 Id..141
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keeping its perpetrators out of Europe[,] while possibly satisfying on some level, provides 
neither accountability nor redress.”   146
2. The Alien Tort Statute is a Successful Type of “Self-Help Universal 
Jurisdiction” in the United States.  
The universal jurisdiction analysis above suggests that the power of the United States, 
relative to the other countries in the world, influences judicial attitudes across the globe. As a 
result, in situations “where the political branches to not hesitate to interfere with the judicial 
ones,”  it is paramount for citizens to exercise pressure through different routes: the Alien Tort 147
Statute (ATS) is one of them. The ATS grants U.S. federal district courts “original jurisdiction of 
any civil law action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a 
treaty of the United States.”   148
Describing the ATS, Professor Weiss emphasizes the paradox that “the United States, 
enemy number one of the International Criminal Court, is also the country whose judiciary – 
including, as of [2004], the Supreme Court – has been most hospitable to the exercise of this 
kind of self-help universal jurisdiction.”  Since the Center for Constitutional Rights 149
“resuscitated” the ATS “from its 200-year slumber” in the landmark case Filartiga v. Pena-
Irala,  in fact, it has become “one of the most successful instruments for exposing torture, 150
disappearance, and other grave human rights violations committed outside the United States, 
through civil suits brought in American courts.”  In 2013, the Supreme Court in Kiobel 151
significantly limited human rights litigation holding that, “the ATS does not apply to human 
rights violations committed in other countries, unless there is strong connection to the United 
States.”  Nonetheless, the ATS would still apply in cases like Salim v. Mitchell, where the 152
perpetrators are U.S. citizens and, therefore, their conduct would touch and concern the United 
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States with sufficient force to overcome the presumption against the extraterritorial application 
of the ATS.   153
In Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, Judge Kaufman engaged in an extensive review of the 
literature, conventions, and case law, condemning torture as a violation of international law. He 
held,  
“In the twentieth century the international community has come to recognize the common 
danger posed by the flagrant disregard of basic human rights…humanitarian and practical 
considerations have combined to lead the nations of the world to recognize that respect 
for fundamental human rights is in their individual and collective interest…Indeed, for 
the purpose of civil liability, the torturer has become – like the pirate and slave trader 
before him – hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind.”   154
In addition to its condemnation of the use of torture, Filartiga is significant because it 
provided “the model for a series of ATS suits by alien plaintiffs claiming violations of their 
internationally recognized human rights against foreign officials acting under the color of 
governmental authority.”  The framework calls for the court to establish, beyond a reasonable 155
doubt, that (1) the offender is a U.S. national or present in the territory of the United States, (2) 
the act was “committed by a person acting under the color of the law,” (3) the perpetrators 
committed those acts whilst in the offender’s custody or control, (4) the perpetrator “specifically 
intended to inflict severe pain or suffering,” and (5) the acts have been committed outside the 
United States.   Weiss notes many advantages for torture victims proceeding through the ATS:   156
“(1) they can initiate the litigation instead of having to persuade a public prosecutor to 
do so; (2) once commenced, they can control the litigation through lawyers of their 
choice; (3) they can introduce all the admissible evidence at their disposal, including that 
which public prosecutors might be reluctant to use for political reasons; (4) last, but not 
least, they can receive compensation for the injury done to them or their murdered 
relatives.”  157
Since Filartiga, there has been a trend towards bringing violations of international law 
under the ATS.  Indeed, Congress’ express intent in enacting the ATS was to provide aliens 158
access to U.S. courts to hold U.S. citizens accountable for violations of international norms. This 
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appears to follow Weiss’s advice: “[o]ne way to take politics out of the quest for justice is for the 
victims to become prosecutors in civil cases.”  This is exactly what the ACLU, on behalf of 159
Salim, Soud, and Rahman, successfully did.  
E. U.S. District Courts Can Help Close the Impunity Gap for U.S. Torture         
Violations. 
1. Proper Accountability for the Past is Needed. 
At the beginning of his presidency, former President Obama said, “[n]othing will be 
gained by spending our time and energy laying blame for the past.”  He was unequivocally 160
wrong. Not only does the absolute prohibition against torture and other cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment, which imposes an unequivocal obligation on the United States to 
investigate, prosecute, and provide repair, remedy and restitution to victims require examination 
of the past, but proper accountability for past gross human rights violations, such as torture, is 
essential for a variety of other reasons.  
First, proper accountability is necessary to avoid undermining global respect for the rule 
of law,  to refrain from weakening “the meaning of the peremptory norm against torture,”  161 162
and avoid future abuses.  Second, these parties must be held accountable so the U.S. might 163
“regain its stature in the international community, and truly uphold [the U.S.] commitment to 
honor international human rights,”  and avoid spreading the dangerous view that the 164
intelligence agencies, responsible for protecting the nation’s security, are beyond the reach of the 
law.  Third, the U.S. should model accountability for other nations, to avoid providing ready 165
excuses for countries unwilling to prevent and prosecute torture,  and to strengthen global 166
efforts to fight terrorism.  Fourth, and most importantly, accountability is essential to provide 167
victims with the redress they deserve.  168
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Perhaps the Obama administration did reflect on the past, by deciding not to invoke, for 
the first time in history, the state secret privilege, which allowed Salim v. Mitchell to move 
forward. However, it nonetheless failed to adequately account for the post-9/11 CIA torture 
program and the U.S. officials involved. As Weiss suggests, the best way to start closing this 
impunity gap for torture violations might be to empower victims to become prosecutors in civil 
actions.  169
2. U.S. Courts are Optimal Venues to Seek Redress for Torture Abuses. 
At the international level, the use of universal jurisdiction by foreign countries in an 
attempt to bring redress to several victims of the post-9/11 CIA torture program, has proved to be 
controversial and often ineffective. In the majority of cases, the United States’ political pressure 
on other governments prevented foreign courts from asserting their jurisdiction over U.S. 
perpetrators. The only successful foreign prosecution was conducted by Italy, whose Supreme 
Court convicted, in absentia, 25 U.S. officials for their involvement in extraordinary rendition 
operations. However, most have remained “beyond the reach of Italian law by not traveling to 
Europe,” and several of those convicted have now been pardoned,  which leaves victims with 170
minimal redress.   
However, at the domestic level, the ideal venue for prosecution would obviously be the 
criminal courts of the United States. Ideally, a special prosecutor would be appointed to 
investigate the torture policies and hold accountable those responsible. By declassifying the 
SCCI Report, the United States openly admitted to the use of torture as part of its investigations 
practice, and as a result is under international and domestic obligation to prosecute those 
responsible.  However, Professor Davis mentions that it is nearly impossible to conceive of 
prosecuting a former president.  After the Bush administration, in fact, the Obama 171
administration (besides issuing the executive order that formally closed the CIA’s RDI program 
and appointing prosecutor Durham to conduct his ineffective investigation) failed to provide 
redress to the victims of the torture program. The Trump administration is unquestionably on the 
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same, if not worst, track. The Trump administration has explicitly threatened to reopen the CIA 
black sites and  reintroduce the use of torture.  172
Nonetheless, Salim v. Mitchell demonstrates that victims have some form of redress in 
domestic civil courts. As the case demonstrates, the ATS framework provides an optimal venue 
for future prosecutions in U.S. district courts. Salim v. Mitchell is a historic landmark for victims 
of the post-9/11 CIA torture program. Despite not holding a full trial, the settlement held 
perpetrators accountable for their abuses. In the words of Director of ACLU National Security 
Project Hina Shamsi, “[g]overnment officials and contractors are on notice that they cannot hide 
from accountability for torture.”  Indeed, the Salim v. Mitchell settlement changed the legal 173
landscape by demonstrating domestic courts are “fully capable of handling lawsuits involving 
abuses committed in the name of national security.”   174
The two psychologists likely “avoided a trial that would have brought into full light of an 
American courtroom what happened in” the CIA black sites, by settling the lawsuit.  175
Nonetheless, for the first time in history victims of the torture program won against a system that 
previously failed to provide any accountability for post-9/11 CIA torture victims. The lawsuit not 
only forced the U.S. to declassify and release 274 new documents during pre-trial discovery, 
which provided “the fullest picture yet of what the three men suffered in that secret CIA 
dungeon,”  but most importantly it helped spread awareness by making their stories public. 176
While U.S. officials may prefer to close the book on this dark period of U.S. history, there is new 
hope for torture victims to find redress.  
III. Conclusion 
Salim v. Mitchell demonstrates the ability of U.S. federal courts to handle torture 
violation claims, and provides a guiding light to remedy the harm suffered by the victims of the 
post-9/11 CIA torture program. Through examining the historical background of the post-9/11 
CIA torture program, this comment articulates the universally accepted prohibition against 
torture, which is firmly embedded in customary international law, international treaties signed 
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and ratified by the United States, and in U.S. domestic law. It further assesses the obstacles to 
applying universal jurisdiction, and highlights the Alien Tort Statute as an effective alternative 
mechanism for the exercise of a “self-help universal jurisdiction” within U.S. federal courts. The 
research suggests that U.S. courts are the optimal venue to seek redress for victims of the 
post-9/11 CIA torture program because Salim v. Mitchell shows it may be the last refuge of hope 
for victims in a world where the U.S. has otherwise failed to fulfill its duty to prosecute torture 
perpetrators. “Accountability and prosecution of the perpetrators of these atrocious human rights 
violations is a necessity: a necessity if we are ever to have a world free from torture.”177
 Michael Ratner, Litigating Guantanamo, in INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS CRIMES 2011 177
(Wolfgang Kaleck, Michael Ratner, Tobias Singelnstein & Peter Weiss eds., Springer, 2007). 
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